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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT2 OF UTAH

S..:\:\IUEL 1-\Di\:\IS and HILDA
~I. AD.L\~IS, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.,
Case Xo.
9986

vs.
DOX .t\. T.L\YLOR and ~IILDll.ED
B. T.L\ YLOR, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

ST.c\TE:\IENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
This is an unlawful detainer action by 'vhich respondents seek restitution of premises and treble damages against appellants and in 'vhich appellant counterclaim for specific performance of a verbal lease and
option to purchase.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court gave judgment "no cause of
action" on Plaintiffs' complaint for restitution and
damages, and on appellants' counter-claim declared
that the appellants were properly in possession of the
property under a lease, but denied appellants judgment on option to purchase.

RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondents seek reversal of the lower court's
award of possession to the appellants and on their
cross-appeal ask for restitution of the premises to the
respondents and award of treble damages for failure
to vacate.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as presented in appellants
brief are substantially true except as to the changes
which are set forth herein pointing out and emphasizing
appellants' statements inconsistent with the facts. Respondents point out some facts for emphasis and assert
other facts as cor1trolling factors in the case.
The appellants contended that they originally
agreed on a ten-year lease. Respondents claim lease
was to have been from three to five years ( T. 24, L. 4).
The Taylors never at any time gave an option to
buy, but rather stated that Taylors would have the first
4
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chance lo buy if the tin1e ever carne that they decided
to sell ( 'r. 2~j, ~ti).
'!'here \Vas a dispute among the parties present as
to ho\v tnuch of the land should have been surveyed.
~lr. Taylor stated it \vas to go back to the post ( T. 1~).
~Ir. Fifield, the surveyor, stated that he didn't go to
the post, and that it could ha,~e been 'vithin 10, 20, or
50 feet; but he never 'vent to the post ('f. 110). :\Irs.
Adams testified that the surveyor 'vent farther than she
told hin1 to go ( T. 30) , that a copy of the pia t was not
g·iven to ~Irs . .1\.dams until some months later ( 'r. 42).
,-fhe lease "·as given back to appellants' attorney a
day or two after received, and respondents were never
presented with another lease ( T. 29), and the respondents never had another lease prepared "·ith the four-orfive-year provision in it, although l\Ir. Taylor stated
they \Vere going to do so after they signed Exhibit .r\.
(T. 19).
It is stipulated between the counsel that the officer
serv-ing the notice "~ould have testified that he served
l\Irs. Taylor personally, by giving her a copy of the
notice to Quit and ,.,.. acate at the place of business, and
that Chief ~Iottisha"· 'vould have testified that he prepared the notice for 1nailing and personally placed the
notice in an env-elope and delivered it to his secretary
for mailing by certified mail, and that she, the secretary, 'vould hav-e testified that she addressed it and
had taken the letter, addressed to )lr. Taylor at his
residence in Clearfield, L~ tab, and mailed it, certified
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mail, in the Layton, Utah, post office on the twelfth
day of January, 1962.
That there were a number of improvements on the
premises, and that plaintiffs' Exhibit ''C" reflects the
condition of the drive-in after remodeling, and plaintiffs' Exhibits "E" and ''}.,, show the condition prior
to their remodeling.
That in the findings of the trial court, the improvements were in excess of $6,000.00, and the testimony
of Mr. Ford was that the whole building could have
been built for about $4,500.00 (T. 122).
It should be pointed out that the property in question was owned solely by Samuel J. Adams, and such
fact "\vas known to the appellants as Mr. Taylor stated
that Mrs. Adams told them Mr. Adams was the owner
(T. 86}.
That Samuel Adams never signed any note or
memorandum giving the Taylors an option to buy or
lease; and while Hilda Adams, wife of Samuel Adams,
did most of the negotiating, there was never any contention at any time that she had any authority in writing to sign for Mr. Adams, either on a lease or an option.
That all evidence clearly points to the fact that the
negotiations were preliminary to drawing the final
lease, and no final lease was ever drawn.

6
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.~.\RGU~IEXrl,

POIXT I
'filE r1,ltiAL C~OUlt'l, ERRED I~ :f.,IXDIN(~ TII.~.\'f TIIERE ''r.£\S .~.\~ EXFORCE.t\llLE LE.~.\SE.
1\ lease to be enforceable for a period longer than

one year under the Utah Code must be in \vriting.
'l.,itle 25, l~hapter 5, Section 3, of the 1953 Utah Code
provides:
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands,
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party by 'vhom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his la ,vful agent
thereunto authorized in writing.''
In this case, because of the fact that )lr. Adams
\vas hard of hearing due to advanced age ( 78 years,
T. -:t6), l\Irs. Adams did most of the talking; but Mr.
Taylor knew that nlr. Adams \Vas the sole owner of
the property, and that he was the person who would
have to sign the lease, as Taylor testified that :\Irs.
Adams had so told them ( T. 86) .
There is no question concerning the fact that no
lease \vas ever signed by San1uel J. Adams, and no
note or memorandum was ever subscribed by him. In
fact, the uncontroverted testimony of )Ir. Adams was
that Taylor should do nothing on it until he got a contract ( T. -:t7), and "'that he, Taylor, signed the contract
7
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before he done any business there, or it was up to him."
(T. 49, L. 6-16). It is also clear that Mr. Adams had
not given Mrs. Adams authority to sign for him, as he
said she had the authority to negotiate, but not to sign
(T. 49).
There can be no question of the fact that there
wasn't compliance with the statute. In fact, it is very
clear that there was no intention on the part of anyone to
be bound without a written lease. The Taylors assumed
the responsibility of getting and supplying it. When
the Taylors proceeded to go ahead, they were taking
a calculated risk, as they were going ahead contrary
to the agreement; and they should not now be able to
complain, as all the Taylors would have had to do at
any point of the negotiations would have been to refuse
to proceed farther until the lease was agreed upon and
signed.
It is a fundamental rule in law that any person
going into possession of property with the permission
of the owner, without having purchased the property,
is there as a tenant. In this case, the Taylors went in
contrary to the agreement, but did go in with permission, as shown by the fact that the rent was accepted.
Williston states that in such cases there is a creation
of the relationship of landlord and tenant.
It is also rather fundamental that where the lease
fails to create another form of tenancy, if the payments
are on a monthly basis, the tenant becomes a month-tomonth tenant.
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Alneriean .Juris prudence \rolume 32. Landlord
and 'renant, Section 71, Page 86, states:
'"Accordingly, a tenancy from year to year or
from month to month arises 'vhere no definite
tin1e is agreed upon, and the rent is fixed at so
much per year or month."
In this ease it is the contention of the respondents
that the tenancy became a month-to-month tenancy
when there was no agreeable lease executed.
'fhe appellants argue that the negotiations and the
tenancy \vas under a verbal lease, and set forth that the
Statute will enforce a verbal lease under the theory of
part performance. However, to have a verbal lease, all
of the elements and details of a lease must be present.
At Am. J ur. 32, Landlord and Tenant, Section
62, Page 77, among other things, provides:
"It is a cardinal principle in the creation of
term for years that the term must be certain,
that is, there must be certainty as to the coinmencement and duration of the term. * * * albeit
there appear no certainty of years in the lease,
yet if, by reference to a certainty, it may be made
certain, it sufficeth. But the reference should
be to a thing that has express certainty at the
time the lease is made, and not to a possible or
casual certainty.''
In the case of Birdzell vs. Utah Oil Refining Company, 242 P. 2nd, Page 578, decided April I, 1952,
"·here there "·as an alleged oral agreement bet\veen the
parties for a lease and a letter setting forth some of the
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conditions, the court sets forth the three essentials in
a contract to make it valid under the STATUTE OF
FRAUDS both as to lease and sell. These are:
FIRST, definite agreement as to the extent
and boundary of the property to be leased.
SECOND, a definite and agreed term.
THIRD, a definite and agreed rental, and the
time and manner of its payment."
In the present case the appellants, as support and
for the terms of the lease, have cited a memorandum
which is marked Plaintiffs' Exhibit A and is set forth
in their statement of facts. They do not claim that this
memorandum is sufficient to constitute a lease, and have
to go outside of the memorandum for some of the other
terms; but they do claim that this, with the other things,
makes up a verbal lease.
In the Birdzell case the Plaintiffs attempted to
claim a lease setting forth the conditions of the proposed
lease as shown in a letter a memorandum sufficient
to take it out of the Statute of Frauds and in that case
the court held :
"The above letter will not suffice as an adequate
memorandum because it lacks an acknowledgment that a contract has been entered into by
the parties."
Applying this test to the present case, it is clear
that there was no acknowledgment on the memorandum
that a contract or a lease had been entered into; and the
memorandum was admittedly not signed by Mr. Adams,
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the o\vner, as he told then1 he \vould not sign it ('r. 48,
L. 6}.
'l,he only fact \vhich ~lr. 1\datns, as the O\vner of
the property. \Vould be chargeable with \Vas the fact
that he pern1itted the 'f'aylors to go in on the basis of
$50.00 per month and accepted payment.
It is admitted that the lease, as prepared by the
'raylors, \\·as unsatisfactory; and as the proposed lease
\vas not produced in court, we can assume that all of
the ter1ns were unsatisfactory, as it ,,·as not signed and
there \\·as no sho,ving as to just \V hich of the terms \vere
acceptable, except that a ten-year lease was not acceptable, and it \\·as admitted that there \vere other changes
to be made.
Inasmuch as the testimony is to the effect that ~Ir.
Bean, the appellants' attorney, was given the lease by
~Irs. Adan1s about two days after it "·as received ( 1,.
27. L. 25), and ~Ir. Bean admitted that he probably
had a copy of the lease in his office ( T. 9, L. 29), the
lease and negotiations up to that time should be considered as having been totally unsatisfactory, and
therefore, only consider the matters surrounding the
renegotiation agreement as sho,vn by the memorandum.
Inasmuch as the memorandum is ambiguous and uncertain in and of itself, and there is no sho,ving that
any specific terms "Tith respect to the lease \vere agreed
upon at that time, it would seem that the lease should
wholly fail.
11
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In the case of Utah Loan & Trust Company vs.
Garbutt~ 6 Utah 342, 23 P. 758, the court states as
follows:
"Under this section, where one executor without authority from his coexecutors, who were not
under a disability and not absent from the state,
made a lease in writing for more than one year,
the lease was invalid."
Under previous heading we also discussed the
requirements that are set forth in the cases showing
the necessity of completeness within and of an oral
agreement and the memorandum showing that it has to
be complete in and of itself and also show the requirements 'for a written lease. Namely, the certainty as to
all of the elements.
Under Adams vs. Manning~ 46 Utah 82, 148 P.
465, the court denied specific performance as follows:
"A receipt or memorandum is wholly insufficient to take an alleged parol contract for sale
of land out of statute of frauds, where it merely
recites receipt of $30.00 a part payment for the
land, but contains no sufficient or any description of land alleged to have been sold."
In the case at bar there is also no description and
no way of ascertaining what the description would be
and as stated from the testimony and facts surrounding
the case, it still is uncertain as to just exactly what
they wanted to have under the terms of the lease. It
is admitted that a survey was made but this was subject
to dispute as set forth in the statement of facts and

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

even then t.he plat \vas not delivered to ~Irs . .i\dan1s
until tnuch later, after the Exhibit "..£\" \vas signed

and there is no reference in the memorandun1 to the
plat or the description of the land and no reference
was llltule at the tin1e of negotiation. X either ~Irs.
'l.,aylor or l\lr. 1\.dams discussed the size of the property and ~lr. Adan1s had property on t'vo sides of the
pieee so it could have been of varying sizes.

Appellants' counsel recognizes the fact that there
Is one uncertainty, namely, as to \vhether the lease
should he four or five years and bases his ,,. hole argument upon the contention that this uncertainty is to be
resolved in favor of the lessee haYing the alternative
right to determine whether the lease should be four
or fiye years. To support his contention he has cited t\vo
old English cases running back to the 18th and 19th
centuries to support his position.
EYen these cases can be distinguished froxn the
present case, as in the 1nain case there "·as a specific
n1emorandum setting forth all of the terms of the lease
sho\\"ing the location, the amount, 'vhen it \vas to commence, 'vhat it was to contain, who \vas to pay taxes
and a number of other items and in addition, it "·as
signed by· both parties, the lessee saying he agreed to
the terms set forth therein. The only question in that
case, \vhich 'vas undetermined "·ith exactness by the
lease~ ,,·as "·hether the term "·as to be seven, fourteen,
or t\venty-one years.
In the present case \Ve have no such agreement.
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We have a written memorandum and oral statement,
both of which it was agreed by the parties would not
constitute the lease until such time as it was drawn up
in detail and executed and signed by the parties.
The appellants claim the doctrine of part performance takes the contract and lease out of the Statute
of Frauds and for the part performance, sets forth
the improvements made on the premises, but even with
partial performance there has to be an enforceable
contract.
In the case of Campbell et al v. Nelson et al.~ 125
P. 2nd, Page 413, decided May 1, 1942, there was an
oral contract for the purchase of land and the contract
was prepared but never signed by the Defendant, who
went into possession of the property and made considerable improvements and when the owner tried to
dispossess him, he claimed the improvements as partial
performance. The court held that:
"The terms of the contract in the present case
were indefinite. An oral contract for the purchase
of real property must be sufficiently definite
and certain so that it can be enforced by the court.
Until the parties have agreed as to the terms
there is not an enforceable contract in fact, and
partial performance cannot make up for the deficiency in the understanding between the parties."

,r

Appellants also cite olume 49, Am. J ur. Statute
of Frauds~ Section 422, Page 727, which among other
things states :
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"'fhat the Defendant n1ay be estopped in vie"·
of the part perforn1ance to assert the S'l'A'rU1.,E as a defense.''
Quoting from 19 Am. Jur., Section 42, Page 642:
~'The

essential elements of an equitable estoppel as related to the party estopped are: ( 1)
Conduct 'vhich amounts to a false representation
or concealment of material facts, or, at least,
'vhich is calculated to convey the impression that
the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent
with, those '\vhich the party subsequently attempts to assert; ( 2) Intention, or at least ex ..
pectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon
by the other party; ( 3) Knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the real facts. As related to the
party claiming the estoppel, they are: (I) Lack
of knowledge and of the means of knowledge
of the truth as to the facts in question; ( 2)
Reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped;
and ( 3) Action based thereon of such a character
as to change his position prejudicially."
It should be noted that there is required to be error
on one side and fault or fraud on the other. In this case,
there is no question of fraud or fault on the part of the
Plaintiffs herein and Defendants do not even contend
such to be the case. It is clear that none of the elements
were present which would cause the Doctrine of Estoppel to arise and this should be disregarded as it
cannot affect or apply in the particular case at hand.
This is further explained in Sections 45, 46, 47, 48,
and 49.
Counsel cites Latses

L,.

r•/ ick Floor., Inc ..,

99 Utah

15
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214, 104 P. 2nd 619, to support his theory of part performance. However, the Nick Floor case can be distinguished from the present case. In that case an agent
for the landlord executed a lease complete and regular
on its face, and the tenant went into possession of the
property and made improvements under the lease. It
was determined that the age11t did not have the written
authority and under the Statute_, the lease was void.
However, as improvements were made on the premises
by the tenant in good faith in error, thinking he had
a valid lease, the court ruled that the part performance
took the case out of the Statute.
In contrast to the Floor case, the appellants knew
that there was no authority on the part of Mrs. Adams,
and also knew when they went ahead with the improvements that there had to be a written lease. Also, there
was no fraud upon the part of the Adams.
In the case of Hoggan v. Swayze_, 65 Utah 380,
237 P. 1097, this can also be distinguished, as in that
case a person by written agreement bought an undivided half interest in certain land and subsequently
by verbal agreement it was agreed that the property
would be divided and each party would take half. The
plaintiff made valuable improvements on the one-half
based on the oral agreement. In that case there was
strict reliance on the oral agreement to modify the
written contract, and there was no ambiguity or question as to the terms of the contract and the court granted
specific performance.

16
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In this case the Taylors \vcre specifically told that
they had to have a \vritten contract and, therefore,
could not rely on any oral state1nents.
Also, in the case of In Re Madsen's Estate, I~a
C tah 327 and 259 P. 2nd 595, the court allowed specific
perfornutnce as against the 'vife of the deceased o\vner
'vhcre there "\\·as a contract of sale executed by the
owner of the land in \\-riting, and signed by his 'vife
previous to 'vhich time the owner of the land, 'vho \vas
also the President of the Madsonia Realty Company,
had sold the particular property to the ~ladsonia Realty
Company and had taken from the company the n1oney
for hin1self as payment for the property. At the tin1e
he entered into the contract with his wife and the 'l,hird
Party, he had even sho,vn on the books of the Realty
Company the profit between 'vhat he had sold it to the
realty company for and the price that it had been
resold to the Third Party, as a profit for the realty
company. However, he had failed to execute a deed
to the company, and this was the specific performance
granted by the court. This, of course, would be a perfect
case for estoppel, as it would have been fraud upon
the realty company to do otherwise.
In the case of Randall t\ Tracy Collins Trust Cornpany, 6 Utah 2nd 18, 305 P. 2nd 480, specific performance "yas granted against a 'voman's estate. In
that case the aunt of the Plaintiff 'vas owner of a home
in Provo and o'vner of controlling stock in a savings
and loan company, and she promised the Plaintiff that

17
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if he would come and take care of her and manage the
saYings and loan company, that she would leave him
the stock to the savings and loan company and give
him her home. She gave him the stock to the savings
and loan company, but by will left her home to a onehalf cousin. The Plaintiff had fully performed all of
his duties; and as far as he was concerned, it was a
completed contract. The court granted specific perforn1ance against the estate. It is obvious that it would
have been much more inequitable for the half cousin
to take the home when he had done nothing particularly
for the woman, while the Plaintiff had earned the
delivery.
In that case it was never intended that there should
have been a written agreement and nothing more could
have been done by the Plaitniff until his aunt died and
he found out how the will had been made, and then it
was too late to make a change.
In the specific case, it was always intended that
this be a written agreement, and the appellants admit
that they never had any written agreement drawn up
pursuant to the terms of the memorandum, atlhough
they intended to.
In no case has appellants' counsel been able to
cite or respondents' counsel able to find '"'here this
court has ever granted specific performance of a contract which was intended to be in writing, but was never
reduced to writing,and where the person who was to
reduce it to writing has failed so to do.
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POIN'l, II
COUR'r J>R011 ERL \'" DEX ~~~D
SPECIF~ll, J>ER~'OR~I'""\~CE 01~, ~\X OP'f lOX
'rO PURCHASE.
'filE

'fRI.t\1~

A. SI>ECIJ.,IC l:>ER~_,OR~I.£\XCE l'OlJI.jl)
N 0 'f H..c\ \~E BEEN GRAN'l,ED E\TEN II~,
TI-IElLE HAD BEEN A \TALID OP'l,ION, AS
'l,HERE HAS BEEN NO EXERCISE OR TENDER OF PERF,ORMANCE BY .t\PPEI_JL-L\X'fS.
It is fundatnental that before an option can be
specifically enforced, it must ripen into a contract, and
the option must be exercised by the optionee in accordance with the tern1s and provisions of said option. This
is true, as an option is a unilateral contract.

Am. Jur.~ Vol. 49, Specific Performance, Sec. 117,
P. 137, provides:
"The remedy of specific perfor1nance can be
invoked only upon the theory that the optionee
has accepted the offer and the agreement ha5
ceased to be an option and has ripened into a
mutually binding enforceable contract. It is \vell
established that ,,. hen an option 'vhich the o""ner
of property gives to another for the purchase of
such property is consummated by acceptance
according to its terms 'vithin the time specified,
it merges into a contract for the purchase of
the property which equity "~ill enforce by specific
performance the same as any other contract
wherein the requisite elements of equity jurisdiction are present."

19
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In the present case they are asking for specific
performance of the option contract without ever having
offered the cash to buy to make this option into a binding agreement on which there are the mutual obligations required for specific performance.

Williston on
206, states:

Contracts~

'rol.

1, Section 62, Page

"Action is required by optionee to exercise
option. This is accomplished by his acceptance
of the terms. When optionee decides. to exercise
his option, he must act unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of the option. 'Vhen
the acceptance is made the optionor becomes
bound. Nothing less will suffice. The optionee is
in ·position of either accepting or not."
In some cases the law provides, where requested
in the complaint or counter-claim that specific perform·
ance be enforced for the option on the theory that the
party asserting the claim or counterclaim has exercised
his option and made it ripen into a binding agreement.
Here, there has never been any pretense that an offer
has been made and, therefore, there could be no specific
performance.

B. THE COURT CANNOT GRANT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AN INCOMPLETE VERBAL AGREE~iENT.
Even if there had been a full tender of the money
alleged to be the agreed purchase price, there could
have been no specific performance as contract "\vas not

20
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in \vriting and \Yas not sufficiently complete to be spec-ifically enforceable.
It should be noted here that much n1ore care should
be taken in granting a decree for specific perfortnance
for the sale of property than would be the case in a
lease, as the sale of property alienates the land forever
from the owners, and any mistake cannot be rectified.
hile in a lease for a term of years, the mistake will
rectify itself by the return of the property to the o\vner
at the expiration of the lease period.

'r

It is noted also that such things as exact boundaries and some other terms would not be so pertinent, as
a person could occupy the premises for years without
ever having to have the exact boundaries determined ;
but in a sale the exact boundaries would have to be
deter1nined before the property could be transferred.
However, assuming that the appellants had tendered the alleged prices, it would still be unenforceable,
as the option must have all of the requirements of a
written contract which is specifically enforceable.

Ant. Jur., Specific Performance_, P. 139 of Vol. 49,
Sec. 117, provides:
"The contract consummated by the exercise of
an option is, of course, subject to all the principles and rules with respect to specific performance that apply generally to contracts imposing
mutual obligations. It must be certain as to
price, manner of payment, and description of
the property. If an option is so lacking in material parts that an acceptance of it does not
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make a complete contract, specific performance
may not be decreed."
The Statute of Frauds as set forth in the Utah Code
Title 25, Chapter 5, Section 1, states the manner in
which an option or any other interest in land may be
created as f ollo,vs :
"No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared otherwise than by act or operation
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.''
As can be seen, to comply with the Statute of Frauds)
there must be a specific writing, having therein all the
conditions of the contract. In this case the Defendants
are contending that part performance of the contract
is sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute of
Frauds and would be enforceable. Part performance
cannot cure the defects in a contract or supply terms
that are not there.
-~-It

should be noted that in all the cases investigated
and checked by counsel where there was any holding
that part performance which \vould take it out of the
Statute of Frauds there has been a contract ,vhere all
the terms were agreed upon and the parties have gone
ahead in the manner according to their oral agreement

22
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or defective 'vritten agrcetnent, thinking they \vere living up to their agreen1ent; and they were perforn1ing
under the contract, but the difficulty \\·as in the forn1
of the agreetnent; and so the courts have someti1nes
held that it 'vould be unjust to permit a person to take
advantage of the benefits of the contract as they set
it up and not be liable under the tertns therein.
1n this particular instance, the parties did not go
ahead in the 1nanner that all testified was agreed upon,
na1nely that the agreement was to be in 'vriting and
signed by all the parties; and so the Defendants, by
going ahead and proceeding to make improvements or
nutke payments knew that they were not doing so under
the ter1ns of any written lease or claimed option, and
that the specific terms of the agreement have never
been settled.

It should be noted that in all cases cited under Point
I that said cases will apply with equal force to the argument set forth under Point II.
For the specific enforcement of a contract to be
granted, it is held that the contract must be definite. See
Campbell et al. vs. Nelson et al_, previously cited, as
well as Birdzell t·s. Utah Oil Refining Company_, previously cited, 'vhich states, in addition to matters previously set forth, that:
"It is fundamental that the memorandum
"~hich is relied upon to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds must contain all the essential terms and
provisions of the contract."
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And held:
"That the above lease will suffice as an adequate memorandum, because it makes an acknowledgment or recognition that a contract has
been entered into by the parties."
In the particular case at bar the appellants attemped to show that the description was agreed upon.
It is fundamental that the agreement itself contain the
boundaries or that it refer to a manner in which the
boundaries can be determined by parole evidence or
by some other manner.
Here there is no reference as to how much was to
be specified in the contract and no reference as to how
it could be determined. Mr. Adams owned property on
two sides of the property in question ( T. 22, L. 22).
The surveyor testified that 1\tlrs. Adams told him where
the stakes should be. Mrs. Adams testified that he put
the stakes beyond where she told him to (T. 30). She
also testified that amount of land was not discussed
(T. 29). She assumed that the amount of land would
be the amount that was originally rented each time with
the building, but Taylors wanted a piece about twice
as large ( T. 30) .
The Defendant, Mr. Taylor, stated that the property leased was to extend to a certain pole on the property and the surveyor testified that he didn't stake it
up to that pole. So it can be seen that the extent of
the boundary is very much in doubt even from the parole
evidence, none of which should have been admitted, as
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it \\'as not sho\vn to have been a part of the original
agreement.
In fact, from all the testiinonies it cannot be determined \vhen and if any agreement was ever reached.
'fhe 1nen1orandtun signed by 1\Irs. Adams said n1erely
"four to five years,., which, of course, might be construed to be in the alternative if that 'vas the only quest ion. llo\vever, in the testimony it \vas stated that it
'vas' first agreed to twelve years, then ten years, and
finally the four or five years, and the only agreement
that "·as dra,vn up, as shown by the testimony, was
the lease with option which was never signed and 'vhich
tern1 there was stated to be ten years. Clearly in view
of the testitnony, the term 'vas ambiguous and impossible to determine from any agreement or statements
from the parties. From all the testimonies it is further
shown that there were a number of other details of the
lease 'vhich were never ironed out, such as:
The time of commencement,
'\There it was to be paid,
Whether cash or time on the option,
''Tho "'"as to be responsible for the taxes,
''Tho 'vas to furnish fire insurance, if any was to
to be furnished,
''Thether or not there was to be any responsibility
on the landlord's part of maintenance,
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Whether the lease and option were personal and
who was to be assigned,
'Vhether or not there was to be a grace period allower, and
Whether abstract or title insurance was to be furnished, and if so at whose expense.
From the above and foregoing it is clear that the
appellants are not entitled to specific performance because:
1. Defendants never exercised their option if there

was an option and did not offer to.
2. There was no oral agreement.

a. Because all parties agreed that it should be
written.
b. Because it didn't contain all of the terms of a
binding agreement as clearly required.
3. Even if there was an oral agreement it is not

sufficient as an option agreement must be in writing.
4. The only memorandu1n concerning the agree-

ment was not signed by the owner or any agent authorized in writing.
5. Even if we assume it was signed by an agent,

memorandum is not sufficient as it is incomplete and
doesn't contain all of the terms as required of the writIng.
6. That any purported verbal agreement was in-

defintie, ambiguous and unenforceable.
26
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POINT III
'l'liE COUR'l' ERRED IN FAILING TO
r\\\'1\RD RESPONDEN'fS POSSESSION 01~-,
PRE~IISES AND FAILING
TO A\\' ARD
TREBLE DA~IAGES F 0 R THE APPELLAN1'S' },AlLURE TO QUIT AND VACATE.
As has been clearly shown from the previous points
in respondents' brief, the tenancy as entered into by
the 'faylors could have been nothing except a monthto-month tenancy, and based on a month-to-month tenancy the Adamses were entitled to give the Taylors
notice to quit and vacate.
The 1953 Utah Code Annotated as amended provides in 'l'itle 78, Chapter 36, Paragraph 3, subparagraph 2:
"When, having leased real property for an
indefinite time 'vith monthly or other periodic
rent reserved, he continues in possession thereof
in person or by subtenant after the end of any
such month or period, in cases where the landlord or the successor in estate of his landlord
if any there is, fifteen days or more prior to the
end of such month or period, shall have served
notice requiring him to quit the premises at the
expiration of such month or period."
If due and pr~per notice was given and the Taylors
failed to quit and vacate the premises, then the Adamses
would be entitled to recover the property and damages
for failure to vacate in the time specified.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Here there was no question about the fact that
notice to quit and vacate was duly given to Mrs. Taylor
on the business premises. The appellants claim that
Mr. Taylor did not receive service.
The Code at the title and chapter above stated, but
in Section 6, states:

"NOTICE '1~0 QUIT-HOW SERVED.
The notices required by the preceding sections
may be served, either:
( 1) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally; or,
( 2) If he is absent from his place of resi-

dence, or from his usual place of business, by
leaving a copy with some person of suitable age
and discretion at either place and sending a copy
thereof through the mail addressed to the tenant
at his place of residence or place of business."
The stipulation as to the testimony of the officers
on the manner of service actually made is set forth in
the statement of facts and clearly shows compliance
with the code.
There was no finding as to 'vhether or not such
notice was duly and properly served, and the court
should so find and upon finding should award damages
to the respondents as the unbiased testimony under
stipulation shows serivce to Mr. Taylor by giving a
copy for him to Mrs. Taylor and mailing a copy to him
at his home.
The reasonable rental value of the property was
not specifically set forth in the testimony, but it is
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abundantly clear that the reasonable rental value of
the property \vould be $50.00 per tnonth, so that the
respondents should be entitled to recover $150.00 per
n1onth for each and every month that said Taylors 'vere
in the premises from July I, until these premises are
surrendered by them to the Adamses.
Said title and chapter under Section 10 of Utah
Code provides for treble damages for failure to quit
and vacate pursuant to proper notice.
CONCLUSION
By \vay of summary, the evidence is clear and convincing that there was never a written or verbal lease
entered into and never a valid option to purchase \vhich
\Vas certain in its terms; and, therefore, the holding of
the trial court granting specific performance of the
lease should be reversed. The holding of the trial court
that there was no option agreement which could be specifically enforced should be affirmed. The trial court
should be required to enter a finding that respondents
are entitled to possession of the property and awarding
judgment to then1 for treble damages at the rate of
$150.00 per month from July 1, 1961 until the premises
are finally surrendered to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
LOTHAIRE B. RICH
16 East Stratford Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
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